This paper was published in CCS 2015. With the introduction of the various mitigation deployed in the user space, especially sandbox, the vulnerability in the linux kernel has become a target of the attacker. However, the memory space in the kernel is hard to predict since the kernel space are used by various tasks. In this paper, the author introduces a much stabler way to put desired vulnerable target into kernel memory space by exploiting a use-after-free in linux kernel.
Continue reading “From Collision To Exploitation:Unleashing Use-After-Free Vulnerabilities in Linux Kernel”
This paper was published in Oakland 2014. In this paper, the author presents a generic way to exploit proprietary server even if the source code and the binary code is not available but a crash is found through remote fuzzing test.
Continue reading “Hacking Blind”
This paper was published in Oakland 2015. In this paper, the author introduced COOP (Conterfeit Object Oriented Programming) to bypass the virtual table integrity check and coarse-grained CFI. In COOP, it takes a whole virtual function in C++ code as a gadget to launch the attack. Since the state-of-art CFI does not have a deep knowledge of the semantics of the binary code in C++ and the state-of-art vtable enforcement does not take vtable reuse attack into consideration, COOP attack is hard to be distinguished from benign execution of the program.
Continue reading “Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming”
This paper was published on NDSS2015. Virtual table hijacking is an attack to overwrite the virtual table pointer(vfptr) by utilizing the use-after-free or heap-overflow vulnerability, which finally hijacks the control flow of the program. In this paper, the author proposed an protection on the binary by instrumentation.
Continue reading “VTint: Protecting Virutal Function Tables’ Integrity”
This paper is published in NDSS 2018. In this paper, the author proposed the concept of Object Type Integrity as an orthogonal policy as CFI to protect the target written in C++.
Continue reading “CFIXX: Object Type Integrity for C++”
This week I find that Codeblue CTF takes VTV as a pwn challenge. So I decide to take a note on this paper presenting in USENIX 2014. And I will give a write-up on the pwn challenge some time later. In this paper, the author mainly proposes two CFI mechanism Virtual Table Verification (VTV) for gcc and Indirect Function Call Check (IFCC) for LLVM. Both CFI aim to verify the validity of indirect forward edge target. Continue reading “Enforcing Forward-Edge Control-Flow Integrity in GCC & LLVM”